In this post, we will summarize news on the SolarWinds hack from Symantec’s perspective.

Dec 14, 2020, updated Dec 16, 2020 1

  • Confirmed some of FireEye’s findings on SUNBURST and TEARDROP
  • Acknowledged that 100 of its customers (2000 machines) had received SUNBURST
  • Indicated that SUNBURST was marked by a certificate issued by Symantec (Symantec divested its certificate authority business in 2018)

Dec 21, 2020 2

  • Confirmed FireEye reports that SUNBURST used a delay of ~2 weeks before activating and that it had an exclusion list of domains (i.e., windows domains where it would not start)
  • Indicated that SUNBURST would stop execution if the server on which it was running had specific software (that is typically found on a security researcher’s machine)
  • Indicated that SUNBURST also attempts to disable some software security services via the windows registry
  • Confirmed that SUNBURST will check if api.solarwinds.com resolves to a valid address before continuing

Jan 7, 2021 3

  • Described the domain generation algorithm (DGA) used by SUNBURST
  • Described the clandestine protocol followed by SUNBURST to convey the windows domain name and other details of the compromised server to the C2 over the DNS protocol

Jan 15, 2021 4

  • Continued the description of the clandestine protocol followed by SUNBURST to communicate with the C2
  • Described the sequence of steps in the lead up to a compromised machine establishing an HTTP connection with a second-stage C2

Jan 18, 2021 5

  • Documented RAINDROP a loader (malware) which delivers a payload of Cobalt Strike (similar to TEARDROP)
  • Documented differences between the usage of RAINDROP and TEARDROP. UNC2452 installed RAINDROP on mutliple machines in an organization after the original breach (TEARDROP installations were restricted to the Orion server with SUNBURST)
  • Compared the consturciton of RAINDROP and TEARDROP

Jan 22, 2021 6

  • Detailed how SUNBURST sends data back to UNC2452’s C2

References